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Frictions to Political Competition and Financial Openness

Author

Listed:
  • Aristotelis Boukouras

    (Georg-August-University Göttingen)

  • Kostas Koufopoulos

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

In this paper we present a political economy approach in order to explain the degree of financial openness for an economy. In the model, entrepreneurs, who may have good or bad projects, vote for policies, which are proposed by selfi sh politicians. Two political frictions (ideological adherence and a super- majority requirement) impair political competition and lead to equilibria, where politicians receive corruption bribes. Furthermore, the model implies a non-monotonic relationship between financial openness and corruption and a positive relationship between financial openness and government size. Some of the model predictions are consistent with empirical findings while other predictions have not beeen tested yet.

Suggested Citation

  • Aristotelis Boukouras & Kostas Koufopoulos, 2011. "Frictions to Political Competition and Financial Openness," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 59, Courant Research Centre PEG.
  • Handle: RePEc:got:gotcrc:059
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corruption; fi nancial openness; ideology; politicians;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P43 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Finance; Public Finance

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