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Is a Federal European Constitution for an Enlarged European Union Necessary? Some Preliminary Suggestions using Public Choice Analysis

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Author Info
Friedrich Schneider

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Abstract

In order to guarantee a further successful functioning of the enlarged European Union a Federal European Constitution is proposed. Six basic elements of a future European federal constitution are developed: the European commission should be turned into an European government and the European legislation should consist of a two chamber system with full responsibility over all federal items. Three further key elements are the subsidiarity principle, federalism and the secession right, which are best suited to limiting the domain of the central European authority to which certain tasks are given, such as defense, foreign and environmental policy. Another important feature is direct democracy, which provides the possibility for European voters to participate actively in the political decision making, to break political and interest group cartels, and to prevent an unwanted shifting of responsibilities from EU member states to the European federal level.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, University of Goettingen (Germany). in its series cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers with number 83.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 28 May 2009
Date of revision: 28 May 2009
Handle: RePEc:got:cegedp:83

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Web page: http://www.cege.uni-goettingen.de
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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  1. Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Direct-Democratic Rules: The Role of Discussion," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(3), pages 341-54.
  2. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202, November.
    Other versions:
  3. Oates, Wallace E, 1985. "Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 748-57, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1990. "Tax harmonization and tax competition in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 489-504, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. de Haan, Jakob & Siermann, Clemens L J, 1995. "A Sensitivity Analysis of the Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 197-215.
  6. Levmore, Saul, 1992. "Bicameralism: When are two decisions better than one?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 145-162, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Eichenberger, Reiner, 1994. "The Benefits of Federalism and the Risk of Overcentralization," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(3), pages 403-20.
  8. Buchanan, James M & Faith, Roger L, 1987. "Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1023-31, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Horstmann, Winfried & Schneider, Friedrich, 1994. "Deficits, Bailout and Free Riders: Fiscal Elements of a European Constitution," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(3), pages 355-83.
  10. Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 1994. "Constitutional Economics and Its Relevance for the Evolution of Rules," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(3), pages 321-39.
  11. Feld, Lars P. & Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2000. "Direct democracy, political culture, and the outcome of economic policy: a report on the Swiss experience," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 287-306, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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