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Skills, Social Mobility, and the Support for the Welfare State

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Author Info
Johannes Rincke ()
Robert Schwager ()
Abstract

Many welfare schemes discourage low skilled individuals from working. In the same time, there is widespread support for the welfare state among the highly educated. We suggest a model which explains these seemingly contrasting observations. In our approach, intergenerational social mobility is conditional on labour market participation of the parents. Such mobility increases the supply of high skilled labour in the next generation. To protect their children from the associated fall in wages, middle class parents have an incentive to induce unemployment among low skilled parents, and therefore vote for a social transfer.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, University of Goettingen (Germany). in its series cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers with number 48.

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Length: 32
Date of creation: 14 Sep 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:got:cegedp:48

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Web page: http://www.cege.uni-goettingen.de
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Related research
Keywords: political preferences; voting; unemployment; social mobility; welfare state;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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    Other versions:
  4. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1996. "Social Insurance, Incentives and Risk Taking," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
    Other versions:
  5. Fernandez, Raquel & Rogerson, Richard, 1995. "On the Political Economy of Education Subsidies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 62(2), pages 249-62, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Solon, Gary, 1992. "Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 393-408, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gary Solon, 2002. "Cross-Country Differences in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 59-66, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Schneeweis, Nicole & Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf, 2005. "Peer Effects in Austrian Schools," Economics Series 170, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
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