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Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict

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Author Info
Helmut Bester
Kai A. Konrad

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Abstract

Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, University of Goettingen (Germany). in its series cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers with number 21.

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Length: 22
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:got:cegedp:21

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Web page: http://www.cege.uni-goettingen.de
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Related research
Keywords: Timing of conflict; war; easy targets;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  6. Powell, Robert, 1996. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 255-289, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Anbarci, Nejat & Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2002. "Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms against Threats Can Have Real Effects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 1-16, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Johannes Münster, 2006. "Contests with Investment," Discussion Papers 120, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Johannes Münster, 2007. "Contests with investment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 849-862. [Downloadable!]
  3. Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas, 2005. "Explaining Conflict in Low-Income Countries: Incomplete Contracting in the Shadow of the Future," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Bargaining Versus Fighting," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 657-676, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Runkel, Marco, 2008. "The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts," MPRA Paper 7687, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Runkel, Marco, 2008. "The Desire for Revenge and the Dynamics of Conflicts," MPRA Paper 6746, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Jan 2008. [Downloadable!]
  8. Johannes Münster & Klaas Staal, 2005. "War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside," Discussion Papers 75, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  9. Amegashie, J.A. & Kutsoati, E., 2005. "(Non) Intervention in Intra-State Conflicts," Working Papers 2005-4, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Daniel Lee, 2008. "Going once, going twice, sold! The committee assignment process as an all-pay auction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 237-255, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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