Patronage-Preserving Federalism? Legislative Malapportionment and Subnational Fiscal Policies in Argentina
AbstractThis paper builds on institutional analysis to generate new conclusions about the economic viability of federalism. It does so by suggesting that Weingast´s seminal model of marketpreserving federalism falls short of accounting for the poor fiscal performance of multitiered systems in the developing world. This theoretical deficiency stems to a large extent from the insufficient attention paid by this model to the institutional complexity of federal systems, particularly the public policy effects of legislative malapportionment. Subsequent to an analytical discussion of the potential public spending and distributive politics distortions resulting from overrepresentation, we offer preliminary empirical evidence from Argentina, a federation exhibiting one of the most decentralized fiscal systems in the world and severe imbalances in the territorial distribution of legislative and economic resources. The findings show not only that said imbalances lead to sub-optimal fiscal results but also that they have a mutually-reinforcing relationship with regionalized patronage.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies in its series GIGA Working Paper Series with number 52.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Neuer Jungfernstieg 21, D-20354 Hamburg
Phone: +49 (0)40 42825-593
Fax: +49 (0)40 42825-547
Web page: http://www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
- Atlas, Cary M, et al, 1995. "Slicing the Federal Government Net Spending Pie: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 624-29, June.
- Hans Pitlik & Friedrich Schneider & Harald Strotmann, 2006.
"Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System,"
Public Finance Review, ,
, vol. 34(6), pages 637-662, November.
- Hans Pitlik & Friedrich Schneider & Harald Strotmann, 2005. "Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut fÃ¼r Volkswirtschaftslehre der UniversitÃ¤t Hohenheim, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany 254/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
- Hans Pitlik & Friedrich Schneider & Harald Strotmann, 2005. "Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany’s Intergovernmental Transfer System," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 1426, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hans Pitlik & Friedrich Schneider & Harald Strotmann, 2005. "Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System," IAW Discussion Papers, Institut fÃ¼r Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (IAW) 19, Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (IAW).
- Alberto Porto & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001. "Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 237-256, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bert Hoffmann).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.