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Patronage-Preserving Federalism? Legislative Malapportionment and Subnational Fiscal Policies in Argentina

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  • Jorge P. Gordin

    ()
    (GIGA Institute of Latin American Studies)

Abstract

This paper builds on institutional analysis to generate new conclusions about the economic viability of federalism. It does so by suggesting that Weingast´s seminal model of marketpreserving federalism falls short of accounting for the poor fiscal performance of multitiered systems in the developing world. This theoretical deficiency stems to a large extent from the insufficient attention paid by this model to the institutional complexity of federal systems, particularly the public policy effects of legislative malapportionment. Subsequent to an analytical discussion of the potential public spending and distributive politics distortions resulting from overrepresentation, we offer preliminary empirical evidence from Argentina, a federation exhibiting one of the most decentralized fiscal systems in the world and severe imbalances in the territorial distribution of legislative and economic resources. The findings show not only that said imbalances lead to sub-optimal fiscal results but also that they have a mutually-reinforcing relationship with regionalized patronage.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies in its series GIGA Working Paper Series with number 52.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gig:wpaper:52

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Keywords: Federalism; legislative malapportionment; subnational fiscal policies; patronage; Argentina;

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  1. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
  2. Atlas, Cary M, et al, 1995. "Slicing the Federal Government Net Spending Pie: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 624-29, June.
  3. Hans Pitlik & Friedrich Schneider & Harald Strotmann, 2006. "Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System," Public Finance Review, , , vol. 34(6), pages 637-662, November.
  4. Alberto Porto & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001. "Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 237-256, November.
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