A Paradox of Plenty? Rent Distribution and Political Stability in Oil States
AbstractResource curse theory claims that resource abundance encourages violent conflict. A study of 37 oil-producing developing countries, however, reveals that oil states with very high levels of oil revenue are remarkably stable. An analysis of the ways in which governments spend oil revenues identifies two distinct types of rentier systems – the large-scale distributive state and the patronage-based system – which are strongly linked to instability or its absence. However, some deviant cases, such as Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, illustrate the need for further research. Apparently, the notion of a “paradox of plenty” has neglected rentier mechanisms that avoid conflict.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies in its series GIGA Working Paper Series with number 21.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2006
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- N5 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries
- N50 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - General, International, or Comparative
- O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2006-05-13 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2006-05-13 (Development)
- NEP-ENE-2006-05-13 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-POL-2006-05-13 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Resource curse or not: A question of appropriability,"
Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics
534, Stockholm School of Economics.
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- Paul Collier & V. L. Elliott & Håvard Hegre & Anke Hoeffler & Marta Reynal-Querol & Nicholas Sambanis, 2003. "Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 13938, August.
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- Annegret Mähler, 2009. "Oil in Venezuela: Triggering Violence or Ensuring Stability? A Context-sensitive Analysis of the Ambivalent Impact of Resource Abundance," GIGA Working Paper Series, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies 112, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
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