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Bargaining Power and Enforcement in Credit Markets

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Author Info
Garance Genicot (Georgetown University) and Debraj Ray (New York University) () (Department of Economics, Georgetown University)

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Abstract

In a credit market with enforcement constraints, we study the effects of a change in the outside options of a potential defaulter on the terms of the credit contract, as well as on borrower payoffs. The results crucially depend on the allocation of “bargaining power” between the borrower and the lender. We prove that there is a crucial threshold of relative weights such that if the borrower has power that exceeds this threshold, her expected utility must go up whenever her outside options come down. But if the borrower has less power than this threshold, her expected payoff must come down with her outside options. In the former case a deterioration in outside options brought about, say, by better enforcement, must create a Lorenz improvement in state-contingent consumption. In particular, borrower consumption rises in all “bad” states in which loans are taken. In the latter case, in contrast, the borrower’s consumption must decline, at least for all the bad states. These disparate findings within a single model permit us to interpret existing literature on credit markets in a unified way. Classification-JEL Codes: O120, O160, G190

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Paper provided by Georgetown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number gueconwpa~05-05-09.

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Handle: RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~05-05-09

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Keywords: credit; no commitment; enforcement; bargaining power;

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  1. Dilip Mookherjee & Debraj Ray, 2002. "Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 818-849, September. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Kocherlakota, Narayana R, 1996. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(4), pages 595-609, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Kranton, Rachel E. & Swamy, Anand V., 1999. "The hazards of piecemeal reform: british civil courts and the credit market in colonial India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-24, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Kimball, Miles S, 1988. "Farmers' Cooperatives as Behavior Toward Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 224-32, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Swinnen, Johan F.M. & Vandeplas, Anneleen, 2007. "Contracting, Competition, and Rent Distribution Theory and Empirical Evidence from Developing and Transition Countries," 103rd Seminar, April 23-25, 2007, Barcelona, Spain 9413, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  2. Andreas Madestam, 2008. "Informal Finance: A Theory of Moneylenders," Working Papers 347, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
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