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The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules

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Author Info
Yves Balasko
Hervé Crès

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Département d'Econométrie, Université de Genève in its series Cahiers du Département d'Econométrie with number 95.01.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gen:geneem:95.01

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Keywords: voting ; decision making;

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  1. Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. CRES, Herve & TVEDE, Mich, 2001. "Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets," Les Cahiers de Recherche 722, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Estelle Cantillon, 2001. "A Graphical Analysis of Some Basic Results in Social Choice," NBER Technical Working Papers 0268, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-28.


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