Migration, Unemployment and Discrimination
AbstractThis paper uses a dynamic efficiency-wage model to analyze the consequences of immigration for a small country when there is discrimination against immigrants in a dual labor market with unemployment. Discrimination is of the type "equal pay for equal work, but unequal work" which is characteristic of economies with "guest-worker" systems. The model exhibits three regimes for rising immigration levels. Immigration is most beneficial for natives in the intermediate regime. An analysis of regime switches shows that changes attributable to "globalization" and technical progress are consistent with growing opposition to immigration.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève in its series Research Papers by the Institute of Economics and Econometrics, Geneva School of Economics and Management, University of Geneva with number 2000.03.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2000
Date of revision:
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Migration; Dual labor market; Efficiency wages; Discrimination;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
- J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
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