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The ‘emulator effect’ of the Uruguay round on US regionalism

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  • Marco Fugazza
  • Frédéric Robert-Nicoud

Abstract

Using a detailed data set at the tariff line level, we find an emulator effect of multilateralism on subsequent regional trade agreements (RTAs) involving the US. We exploit the variation in the frequency with which the US grants immediate duty free access (IDA) to its RTA partners across tariff lines. A key finding is that the US grants IDA status especially on goods for which it has cut the multilateral MFN tariff during the Uruguay Round the most. Thus, the Uruguay Round (multilateral) ‘concessions’ have emulated subsequent (preferential) trade liberalisation. We conclude from this that past liberalisation may sow the seeds of future liberalisation.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Département des Sciences Économiques, Université de Genève in its series Research Papers by the Department of Economics, University of Geneva with number 11111.

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Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gen:geneem:11111

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Related research

Keywords: Regionalism; Multilateralism; Stumbling bloc; Uruguay Round.;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Richard Baldwin, 2011. "Unilateral tariff liberalisation," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd10-159, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  2. Mathias Thoenig & Thierry Mayer & Philippe Martin, 2010. "The geography of conflicts and free trade agreements," Sciences Po publications 7740, Sciences Po.

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