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A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium for Strategic Form Games

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Author Info
Sergio Currarini ()
Marco Marini ()

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Abstract

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show that CCE exist for all symmetric supermodular games. Furthermore, we discuss the existence of a CCE in specific submodular games employed in the literature on environmental agreements.

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Paper provided by Grand Coalition Web Site in its series Grand Coalition with number 37.

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Date of creation: 11 Dec 2002
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Handle: RePEc:gco:abcdef:37

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Related research
Keywords: Cooperative games coalitions organizations design graphs cooperation externalities.

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Sergio Currarini & Marco A. Marini, 2003. "Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies," Grand Coalition 68, Grand Coalition Web Site. [Downloadable!]
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