We consider the stability of coalitions in purely hedonic settings, where a player's payoff is completely determined by the identity of other members of her coalition. We discuss how the hedonic setting differs from non-hedonic ones and study the relationship of some conditions that are sufficient for the existence of core stable coalition partitions; i.e., partitions of players into coalitions such that no group of players could benefit by breaking off from their coalitions to form their own coalition. Next, we provide a series of sufficient conditions for the existence of individually stable coalition partitions; i.e., coalition partitions such that no player could benefit from moving to a new coalition while not hurting the members of the new coalition. We show that in settings where coalitions can be ordered according to certain characteristics and players have single-peaked preferences over those characteristics, or where players have symmetric and additively separable preferences, there always exists an individually stable coalition partition. If these conditions are relaxed, individually stable coalition partitions may not exist. We also discuss other weaker and stronger stability concepts, and show the incompatibility of individual stability with other normative properties such as Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, and population monotonicity.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Grand Coalition Web Site in its series Grand Coalition with number
26.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992.
"Two-sided matching,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.) This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.