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Cooperation and equity in the river sharing problem

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Author Info

  • Ambec, S.
  • Ehlers, L.

Abstract

This paper considers environments in which several agents (countries, farmers, cities) share water from a river. Each agent enjoys a concave benefit function from consuming water up to a satiation level. Noncooperative extraction is typically inefficient and any group of agents can gain if they agree on how to allocate water with monetary compensations. The paper describes which allocations of water and money are acceptable to riparian agents according to core stability and several criteria of fairness. It reviews some theoretical results. It then discusses the implementation of the proposed allocation with negotiation rules and in water markets. Lastly, it provides some policy insights.

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File URL: http://www.grenoble.inra.fr/Docs/pub/A2007/gael2007-06.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) in its series Working Papers with number 200705.

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Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200705

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Related research

Keywords: WATER ALLOCATION; GAME; CORE; WATER MARKET; NEGOTIATION; RULES; EXTERNALITIES;

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Cited by:
  1. Beard, Rodney, 2011. "The river sharing problem: A review of the technical literature for policy economists," MPRA Paper 34382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Erik Ansink & Carmen Marchiori, 2009. "Reallocating Water: An Application of Sequent," Working Papers 2009.126, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Baomin Dong & Debing Ni & Yuntong Wang, 2012. "Sharing a Polluted River Network," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(3), pages 367-387, November.
  4. Erik Ansink, 2009. "Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation," Working Papers 2009.73, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. Wang, Yuntong, 2011. "Trading water along a river," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 124-130, March.

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