Cooperation and equity in the river sharing problem
AbstractThis paper considers environments in which several agents (countries, farmers, cities) share water from a river. Each agent enjoys a concave benefit function from consuming water up to a satiation level. Noncooperative extraction is typically inefficient and any group of agents can gain if they agree on how to allocate water with monetary compensations. The paper describes which allocations of water and money are acceptable to riparian agents according to core stability and several criteria of fairness. It reviews some theoretical results. It then discusses the implementation of the proposed allocation with negotiation rules and in water markets. Lastly, it provides some policy insights.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) in its series Working Papers with number 200705.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
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WATER ALLOCATION; GAME; CORE; WATER MARKET; NEGOTIATION; RULES; EXTERNALITIES;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2007-06-18 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2007-06-18 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-06-18 (Game Theory)
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- Alexandre Le Vernoy & Patrick Messerlin, 2010. "Water and the WTO: Don’t kill the messenger," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/5l6uh8ogmqi, Sciences Po.
- Wang, Yuntong, 2011. "Trading water along a river," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 124-130, March.
- Baomin Dong & Debing Ni & Yuntong Wang, 2012.
"Sharing a Polluted River Network,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(3), pages 367-387, November.
- Beard, Rodney, 2011. "The river sharing problem: A review of the technical literature for policy economists," MPRA Paper 34382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Erik Ansink & Carmen Marchiori, 2009. "Reallocating Water: An Application of Sequent," Working Papers 2009.126, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Erik Ansink, 2009. "Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation," Working Papers 2009.73, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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