Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision
AbstractIn this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by the sequences of discount rates varying in time. For such a wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences, we determine subgame perfect equilibria between the union and the firm for the case when the union is supposed to go on strike in each period in which there is a disagreement. A certain generalization of the original Rubinstein bargaining model is applied to determine these equilibria.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure in its series Working Papers with number 0930.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
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union - firm bargaining; alternating offers; varying discount rates; subgame perfection;
Other versions of this item:
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2009. "Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision," Post-Print halshs-00464387, HAL.
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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