Compétition pour les paiements : une titanomachie revisitée par la modélisation multi-agents
AbstractThe main purpose of this paper is to study the economics of interchange fee in payment card association. The different arrangements for interchange fees and the nosurcharge rule lower the level of competition intensity that would otherwise have occurred and push interchange fees up. In many countries, competition regulators carried out investigations on the lack of transparency and competition in these card-based payment systems, and took measurements for an optimal determination of interchange fees. To help understand and predict the evolution of payment markets, we use an agent-based model that simulates strategic behaviours for different levels of interchange fee. We thus observe the social welfare and the intensity of competition on both the buyer and seller sides of intermediate markets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure in its series Working Papers with number 0810.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
agent-based models; payment systems; two-sided markets;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E47 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-06-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2008-06-07 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-KNM-2008-06-07 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Graeme Guthrie & Julian Wright, 2003. "Competing Payment Schemes," Departmental Working Papers wp0311, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
- Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King, 2003. "A Theoretical Analysis of Credit Card Reform in Australia," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 79(247), pages 462-472, December.
- Wilko Bolt & David Humphrey & Roland Uittenbogaard, 2005.
"The effect of transaction pricing on the adoption of electronic payments: a cross-country comparison,"
05-28, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Wilko Bolt & David Humphrey & Roland Uittenbogaard, 2005. "The Effect of Transaction Pricing on the Adoption of Electronic Payments: A Cross-Country Comparison," DNB Working Papers 071, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Gans Joshua S & King Stephen P, 2003. "The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, August.
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