Sandra Deungoue () (GATE, University of Lyon, CNRS, ENS-LSH, Centre Léon Bérard, France)
Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to study the economics of interchange fee in payment card association. The different arrangements for interchange fees and the nosurcharge rule lower the level of competition intensity that would otherwise have occurred and push interchange fees up. In many countries, competition regulators carried out investigations on the lack of transparency and competition in these card-based payment systems, and took measurements for an optimal determination of interchange fees. To help understand and predict the evolution of payment markets, we use an agent-based model that simulates strategic behaviours for different levels of interchange fee. We thus observe the social welfare and the intensity of competition on both the buyer and seller sides of intermediate markets.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure in its series Working Papers with number
0810.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
repec:bep:eaptop:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1069-1069 is not listed on IDEAS