Democracy of "Taxation-Redistribution" and Peacetime Budget Deficit
AbstractThe link between an introduction of the universal suffrage and the growth of government spending has been established in some literature (Meltzer, Richard, 1981, Aidt et al., 2006, Funk and Guthmann, 2006). In this article we try to identify a more detailed mechanism behind that link. So, we addressed to the conflict of interest of bureaucrats, and of the state subsidy beneficiaries. Historically the growth of government spending might be traced to the emergence of mainstream left parties, which openly stood in favor of the nanny state and government help from the cradle to the grave as a priority over the provision of pure public goods. Finally we check the hypothesis that the growth of government care correlates with the chronic illnesses of the modern state finance like budget deficit, state debt and inflation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy in its series Working Papers with number 0078.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision: 2013
Universal Suffrage; Left parties; Budget Deficit; Conflict of Interest.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
- N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-01-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2014-01-10 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2014-01-10 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2014-01-10 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2014-01-10 (Public Finance)
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