Modern Robbers: Special Interest Groups And Braking The Economic Growth
AbstractSmall well-motivated groups, including state officials, public and community activists, politicians etc proved their capacity to impose burden on economy. The power to do so in modern Market Democracies could be reached without “unsheathing the sword”. Old fashioned redistribution experts - roving bandits are crowded out by modern ones. The most common way is to use the whole of the state apparatus as a “sword,” and to resort for cover to care for the needy and protection of the vulnerable, the ill-informed, the weak, the sick, or the “unwise” economic agents from all kinds of possible dangers. The longer list of the categories of persons in need of protection because of their “weakness,” "underprivileged statute in the past" etc, the easier it becomes to justify regulatory interference, the growth of the state apparatus, the increase in state insurance programming, and other budgetary expenses. Classical liberal epoch's legislator presumed the economic agent is reasonable, rational and responsible. This assumption had been gradually substituting for the last century, by the implicit assumption of citizen's' limited capacity. The mechanism of the impact upon economic growth achieved by means of special interests groups’ expansion has been described by M. Olson. “Protection” takes place by means of market entry barriers placed in the way of agents or by means of various controls and regulations. One who imposes heavy Regulatory burden in the emerging markets, in transitional economies with weak property protection makes running fair business almost unaffordable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy in its series Published Papers with number 141.
Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision: 2013
special interest groups; personal capacity assumptions; excessive regulation; regulations' reproduction;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
- N14 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: 1913-
- O43 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
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