The Optimal Majority with an Endogenous Status Quo
AbstractUsing the voting procedure proposed by Baron (1996), the consequences are examined of changing the majority required to change legislation. When the majority required is greater than fifty percent, and when voters behave strategically, the first policy proposed (on a stationary equilibrium path) is never defeated subsequently. Which policy gets proposed first depends on which voter gets to make the first proposal. But increasing the required majority induces a meanâpreserving spread on the distribution of these policies, if voters' types are distributed symmetrically. Thus before the voting procedure begins, voters would prefer unanimously to see the required majority reduced. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2003
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by York (Canada) - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 95-8.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
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Postal: YORK UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 4700 KEELE ST-NORTH YORK ONTARIO H3J 1P3 CANADA.
Phone: (416) 736-5083
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Web page: http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/
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GAME THEORY; VOTING;
Other versions of this item:
- Sam Bucovetsky, 2003. "The optimal majority with an endogenous status quo," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 131-148, 08.
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- Cardona, Daniel & Ponsati, Clara, 2011. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 65-75, September.
- Clara Ponsatí & Daniel Cardona, 2008.
"Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
762.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Daniel Cardona & Clara Ponsaté, 2008. "Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules," Working Papers 375, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
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