Effective Parties in a Model of Repeated Legislative Bargaining
AbstractA self-enforcing equilibrium account of legislative party organization in the context of the standard legislative bargaining model demonstrates how a member of a party would overcome the temptations to violate a party's agreement to stick together on legislative matters in the absence of external enforcement. The model is robust, and realistic, in the sense that departures from the equilibrium path lead eventually to restablishment of intra-party cooperation. Thus we construe legislative politics in a way that would support either a purely preference-based equilibrium or a equilibrium in which the legislature has an internal system of party organization that influences members sometimes to vote indifferently than they would based on their myopic issue preferences alone.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Western Sydney - School of Business And Technology in its series Papers with number 211.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN SYDNEY,(MACARTHUR), SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY, CAMPBELTOWN NSW 2560 AUSTRALIA.
Web page: http://www.uws.edu.au/sob
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POLITICAL PARTIES ; LEGISLATIVE POWER ; VOTING;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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