Information Pooling Through Majority-Rule Voting: Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Correlated Votes

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Information Pooling Through Majority-Rule Voting: Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Correlated Votes

Author Info

Ladha, K.K.

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Paper provided by Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy in its series Papers with number 159.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1991
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Handle: RePEc:fth:waslbp:159

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Postal: WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST-LOUIS, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND CENTER IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, ST-LOUIS MISSOURI 63130 U.S.A.
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