The Institutional Effect on Majority Rule Instability: Bicameralism in Spatial Policy Decisions
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to report on experiments that test for an independent effect of bicameralism on legislative stability. The experiments are designed to test the theory of the bicameral core (Hammond and Miller 1986), which demonstrates that a bicameral legislature is more apt to have stable undominated policy choices than a unicameral legislature with the same number of legislators holding the same preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University in its series Washington University with number 98-07.
Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
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Postal: Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University. Campus Box 1133, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis MO 63130-4899.
Web page: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/ble/
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SOCIAL CHOICE ; VOTING ; INSTITUTIONS;
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