In a Walres-debreu world, all relevant attributes of all traded commodities are completely and costlessly specified, information is symmetric and costless, and all contracts ate costlessly enforced. In the real world in which trade takes place, it is costly to specify and verify commodity attributes, profound information asymmetries can exist, and parties have an incentive to renege opportunistically on their contractual commitments.
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Paper provided by Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University in its series Washington University with number
97-05.
Length: 19 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:wablec:97-05
Contact details of provider: Postal: Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University. Campus Box 1133, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis MO 63130-4899. Web page: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/ble/ More information through EDIRC
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