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Delegation and Mergers in Oligopoly

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Author Info
Gonzalez-Maestre, M.
Lopez-Cunat, J.

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze the effect strategic delegation on the profitability of mergers in the context of a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and cost functions. It is assumed that, after the merging process is completed, the owner of every independent firm decides its managerial incentive for his manager.We showhtat the required fraction of merging firms for a merger to be profitable, in our model with delegation, is substantially smaller that without delegation.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Valencia - Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas in its series Papers with number 99-03.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:valinv:99-03

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Postal: Instituto Valenciano de InvEstigaciones Economics, C/Guardia Civil, 22, Esc. 2, 1 46020 Valencia (Espana).
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Related research
Keywords: OLIGOPOLIES MERGERS

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Oliver Gürtler & Matthias Kräkel, 2006. "Mergers, Litigation and Efficiency," Discussion Papers 185, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Thilo W. Glebe & Uwe Latacz-Lohmann, 2005. "Optimal adjustment of environmental policy following agricultural trade liberalization," Discussion Papers 082005, Technische Universität München, Environmental Economics and Agricultural Policy Group. [Downloadable!]
  3. Matthias Kräkel & Dirk Sliwka, 2002. "Strategic Delegation and Mergers in Oligopolistic Contests," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse2_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Emilie Dargaud, 2005. "Monopolization through acquisitions in a differentiated product industry," Working Papers 0507, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
  5. Emilie Dargaud, 2007. "Active firms in horizontal mergers and cartel stability," Post-Print halshs-00164900_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  6. Emilie Dargaud, 2005. "Monopolization through acquisitions in a differentiated product industry," Post-Print halshs-00180041_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  7. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Straume , Odd Rune & Sorgard, Lars, 2002. "Downstream Merger with Oligopolistic Input Suppliers," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  8. Steffen Huck & Kai Konrad, 2003. "Strategic Trade Policy and Merger Profitability," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH, 2002. "Union Delegation and Incentives for Merger," Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Discussion Paper 2002010, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
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