This paper studies simple hiring procedures for job markets. We show that when agents act strategically only individually rational outcomes should be expected. Moreover, if agents can form unions, thereby gaining the possibility to commit on the decision to be chosen, only stable allocations are implemented.
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Paper provided by Valencia - Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas in its series Papers with number
98-02.
Find related papers by JEL classification: J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
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