Unfolding Social Hierarchies in Large Population Games

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Unfolding Social Hierarchies in Large Population Games

Author Info

Vega-Redondo, F.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Fernando Vega-Redondo

Abstract

Consider a large (continuum) population of finitely-lived agents organized in hierarchical levels. Every period, agents matched to play a certain symmetric game. On the basis of the payoffs obtained, a certain p-fraction of those who performed best at each level are promoted upwards. On the other hand, newcomers replacing those who die every period enter at the lowest level and imitate unbiasedly (but subject to noise) the action adopted at the highest one.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Valencia - Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas in its series Papers with number 97-23.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:valinv:97-23

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Related research
Keywords: GAMES POPULATION

Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Fernando Vega Redondo, 1997. "- Unfolding Social Hierarchies In Large Population Games," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Fudenberg, D. & Harris, C., 1992. "Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 420-441, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- FUDENBERG, Drew & HARRIS, Christopher, 1992. "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks," IDEI Working Papers 13, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Other versions:
- Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms," Penn CARESS Working Papers bdb2c3969ad56e98068513c7c, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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Fershtman, Chaim & Murphy, Kevin M & Weiss, Yoram, 1996. "Social Status, Education, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 108-32, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Fershtman, C. & Murphy, K.M., 1993. "Social Status, Education and Growth," Papers 8-93, Tel Aviv.
Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Samuelson Larry, 1994. "Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-65, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Karandikar, R. & Mokherjee, D. & Ray, D. & Vega-Redondo, F., 1996. "Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation," Papers 96-06, Valencia - Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas.
Other versions:
- Karandikar, Rajeeva & Mookherjee, Dilip & Ray, Debraj & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1998. "Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 292-331, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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