This paper proposes an aspiration-based model for (anonymous) cooperation where a large population of agents are re-matched every period to play a Prisoner's Dilemma. At each point in time, agents hod a certain common aspiration level which is updated on the basis of population-average experience. The induced process is shown to converge in the long run under quite general conditions.
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Paper provided by Valencia - Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas in its series Papers with number
96-20.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
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