This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Economic Logic for Conditioning Bell Entry into Long Market Distance on the Prior Opening of Local Markets

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Schwartz, M.
Abstract

One of the most important and most contentious issues for regulation and competition raised by the 1996 Telecommunications Act is when to authorize the regional Bell companies to offer long-distance services. The Department of Justice (DOJ) adopted a standard requiring that a Bell's local market must first be irreversibly open to competition. This paper analyzes the competitive benefits and costs of authorizing Bell entry, explains the DOJ's standard, and argues that the incentives created by this standard will help achieve the Act's competitive goals more efficiently and rapidly than other standards, ultimately reducing the need for intrusive regulation.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division in its series Papers with number 00-4.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:usjuat:00-4

Contact details of provider:
Postal: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; ANTITRUST DIVISION, JUDICIARY CENTER BUILDING 555 4TH ST. N.W. WASHINGTON D.C. 20001 U.S.A..
Email:
Web page: http://www.justice.gov/atr/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords: COMPETITION ; LICENCES ; MARKET STRUCTURE ; TELECOMMUNICATIONS;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 archives contribute their bibliographic data to RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.