When a public good is excludable it is possible to charge individuals for using the good. We study the role of prices on excludable public goods within an extension of the Stern-Stiglitz version of the Mirrlees optimal income tax model. Our discussion includes both the case where the public good is a final consumer good and the case where it is an intermediate good.
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Paper provided by Uppsala - Working Paper Series in its series Papers with number
2001-14.
Length: 24 pages Date of creation: 2001 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:uppaal:2001-14
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Find related papers by JEL classification: H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
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