Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games can be computed as the Nash equilibria games, obtained by assigning weights to the separate criteria of a player. To analysts, these weights are usually unknown. This paper therefore proposes ideal equilibria, strategy profiles that are robust against unilateral deviations of the players no matter what improtance is assigned to the criteria.
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Paper provided by Uppsala - Working Paper Series in its series Papers with number
1999:19.
Length: 19 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:uppaal:1999:19
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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