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Credibility and Duration of Political Contests and the Extent of Rent Dissipation

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  • Kahana, N.
  • Nitzan, S.

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  • Kahana, N. & Nitzan, S., 1993. "Credibility and Duration of Political Contests and the Extent of Rent Dissipation," Papers 9301, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:tilbur:9301
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hillman, Arye L & Katz, Eliakim, 1984. "Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 104-110, March.
    2. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-1534, November.
    3. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. "Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
    4. Hillman, Arye L., 1984. "Preemptive rent seeking and the social cost of monopoly power," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 277-281, September.
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