Tax Burden and Migration: A Political Economy Perspective
AbstractThe extent of taxation and distribution policy is generally determined at a political-economy equilibrium by a balance between those who gain and those who lose from a more extensive tax-transfer policy. In a stylized model of migration and humain capital formation we find, somewhat against conventional wisdom, that low-skill migration may lead to a lower tax burden and less restriction than
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number 35-96.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/foerder.asp
More information through EDIRC
HUMAN RESOURCES; ECONOMIC POLICY; ECONOMIC MODELS;
Other versions of this item:
- Efraim Sadka & Assaf Razin, 1997. "Tax Burden and Migration: A Political Economy Perspective," IMF Working Papers 97/78, International Monetary Fund.
- Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 1996. "Tax Burden and Migration: A Political Economy Perspective," NBER Working Papers 5850, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- O15 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 1995.
"Resisting Migration: Wage Rigidity and Income Distribution,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 312-16, May.
- Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 1995. "Resisting Migration: Wage Rigidity and Income Distribution," CEPR Discussion Papers 1091, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Razin, A. & Sadka, E., 1992. "Resisting Migration: Wage Rigidity and Income Redistribution," Papers 28-94, Tel Aviv.
- Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
- Wildasin, D.E., 1992.
"Income Restribution and Migration,"
92-003, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1994.
"Unemployment, wage rigidity, and the returns to education,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 535-543, April.
- Saint-Paul, G., 1993. "Unemployment, Wage Rigidity, and the Returns to Education," DELTA Working Papers 93-11, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Nerlove, Marc & Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim & von Weizsacker, Robert K., 1993. "Comprehensive income taxation, investments in human and physical capital, and productivity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 397-406, March.
- Karin Mayr, 2003. "Immigration and Majority Voting on Income Redistriubtion-Is there a Case for Opposition from Natives?," Economics working papers 2003-08, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Sapir, André, 2000. "Who is Afraid of Globalization? The Challenge of Domestic Adjustment in Europe and America," CEPR Discussion Papers 2595, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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