Reason-Based Choice and Justifiability in Extensive Form Games
AbstractThis paper proposes a procedurally rational solution concept for two-person extensive-form games with complete information. The solution concept is based on the observation that the ex-post justifiability of choices is often a primary concern for decision-makers, especially in organizations. The essential departure from standard rationality lies in the assumption that players have to consider not only the optimality of their strategy, but also the reasonableness of the beliefs that support it. Specifically, they face ex-post criticism, which consists of a (deterministic) theory of the opponent's strategy as well as an alternative recommended strategy. The theory must be consistent with the history and there can be no consistent theory that is simpler. The alternative strategy must do better than the player's strategy against the theory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number 19-99.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/foerder.asp
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GAME THEORY ; BEHAVIOUR ; UNCERTAINTY;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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