An experiment with the hawk-dove game showed that if players observe solely an arbitrary and trivial characteristic of their opponent (e.g. a colour label assigned randomly to each player at the outset), a pattern of discrimination may evolve (i.e. those possessing one of the two colours will play more agreesively than the rest who will be more acquiescent).
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Sydney - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number
98-15.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement