We present a dynamic two-country labour matching economy. Workers decide whether to search in their native country or to look for a job abroad. Firms choose the number of vacancies they post in each country according to the average workers' characteristics inside it. Wages are determined in an individual Nash bargaining.
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Paper provided by Stockholm - International Economic Studies in its series Papers with number
618.
Length: 30 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:stocin:618
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
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