How (Godd) Immigration Is : A Matching Analysis
AbstractWe present a dynamic two-country labour matching economy. Workers decide whether to search in their native country or to look for a job abroad. Firms choose the number of vacancies they post in each country according to the average workers' characteristics inside it. Wages are determined in an individual Nash bargaining.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm - International Economic Studies in its series Papers with number 618.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF STOCKHOLM, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STUDIES, S- 106 91 STOCKHOLM SWEDEN.
Web page: http://www.iies.su.se/
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ECONOMETRICS ; LABOUR MARKET;
Other versions of this item:
- Ortega, Javier, 1997. "How (Good) Immigration is: a matching analysis," Seminar Papers, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies 618, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
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