Inflation versus Taxation: Representative Democracy and Party Nominations
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm - International Economic Studies in its series Papers with number 577.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1994
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF STOCKHOLM, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STUDIES, S- 106 91 STOCKHOLM SWEDEN.
Web page: http://www.iies.su.se/
More information through EDIRC
inflation ; tax policy ; economic policy;
Other versions of this item:
- Beetsma, R.M.W.J., 1994. "Inflation versus taxation: Representative democracy and party nominations," Discussion Paper 1994-78, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Beetsma, R., 1994. "Inflation versus Taxation: Representative Democracy and Party Nominations," Papers 9478, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
- D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
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