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Pricing to Signal Product Line Quality

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Author Info
Bagwell, K.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stanford - Hoover Institution in its series Papers with number e-91-11.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:stanho:e-91-11

Contact details of provider:
Postal: STANFORD UNIVERSITY, HOOVER INSTITUTION, DOMESTIC STUDIES PROGRAM,DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, STANFORD CALIFORNIA 94305 U.S.A.
Phone: 650-723-1754
Fax: 650-723-1687
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Related research
Keywords: enterprises ; industry ; consumers ; economic equilibrium ; production ; costs;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kyle Bagwell, 1990. "Optimal Export Policy for a New-Product Monopoly," Discussion Papers 898, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1988. "Advertising and Limit Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 59-71, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Bagwell, Kyle & Ramey, Garey, 1990. "Advertising and pricing to deter or accommodate entry when demand is unknown," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 93-113. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kyle Bagwell, 2006. "Signaling and entry deterrence: A multi-dimensional analysis," Discussion Papers 0506-16, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006. "Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure," Working Papers 0625, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2003. "Secrecy and Safety," Working Papers 0317, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Sep 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2007. "Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling," Working Papers 0703, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Ingeborg Menzler-Hokkanen & Rolf Langhammer, 1994. "Product and country substitution in imports: An empirical comparison of theoretical concepts," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 130(2), pages 309-328, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Maarten C.W. Janssen & Santanu Roy, 2007. "Signaling Quality Through Prices in an Oligopoly," Departmental Working Papers 0709, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005. "Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling," Working Papers 0520, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2004. "Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a Duopoly when there is Universal Private Information," Working Papers 0417, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

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