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Virtual Implementation In Nash Equilibrium

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Author Info
ABREU, D.
SEN, A.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stanford - Hoover Institution in its series Papers with number e-90-13.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:stanho:e-90-13

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Postal: STANFORD UNIVERSITY, HOOVER INSTITUTION, DOMESTIC STUDIES PROGRAM,DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, STANFORD CALIFORNIA 94305 U.S.A.
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Keywords: social behaviour games economic equilibrium

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  1. David Andolfatto & Ed Nosal & Neil Wallace, 2006. "The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model," Working Paper 0615, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-147, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  3. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Working Papers 2007-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria As A Difficulty In Understanding Correlated Distributions," Economics Working Papers we057238, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Implementation and Preference for Honesty," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-244, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  7. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Olivier, BOCHET & François, MANIQUET, 2006. "Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2006043, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
  9. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Direct Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Majority-Proofness," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-149, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  10. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 353-367, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-148, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  12. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1999. "On the Impossibility of Implementation under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 99-10, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised 1999. [Downloadable!]
  13. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Honesty-Proof Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-178, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  14. Chambers, Christopher P., 2003. "Virtual Repeated Implementation," Working Papers 1179, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Aggregation of Expert Opinions," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Economics Working Papers 0028, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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