Cheap Talk With Two Audiences

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Cheap Talk With Two Audiences

Author Info

FARRELL, J.
GIBBONS, R.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Joseph Farrell

Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stanford - Hoover Institution in its series Papers with number e-89-7.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:stanho:e-89-7

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Postal: STANFORD UNIVERSITY, HOOVER INSTITUTION, DOMESTIC STUDIES PROGRAM,DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, STANFORD CALIFORNIA 94305 U.S.A.
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Other versions of this item:

Article
- Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1989. "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1214-23, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Farrell, J. & Gibbons, R., 1989. "Cheap Talk With Two Audiences," Working papers 518, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.

Cited by:
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Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2008. "Paradox of Credibility," MPRA Paper 7443, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Vincent P. Crawford, 2001. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2001-16, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Vincent P. Crawford, 2003. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 133-149, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2003. "It Takes Two: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace," CEPR Discussion Papers 3947, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2007. "Strategic Information Transmission through the Media," MPRA Paper 5556, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
CAILLAUD, Bernard & TIROLE, Jean, 2007. "Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group," IDEI Working Papers 435, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Consensus building: How to persuade a group," PSE Working Papers 2006-19, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
- Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2007. "Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1877-1900, December.
Evelyn Korn, 2006. "The Information Content of Mandatory Disclosures," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200601, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
Gilat Levy, 2000. "Strategic Consultation in the Presence of Career Concerns," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 404, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
Demichelis, Stefano & Weibull, Jörgen, 2006. "Efficiency, communication and honesty," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 645, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 28 Nov 2006. [Downloadable!]
Oliver Board & Tiberiu Dragu, 2006. "Expert Advice with Multiple Decision Makers," Working Papers 242, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Discussion Papers 1245, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Siddiqi, Hammad, 2007. "Stock Price Manipulation: The Role of Intermediaries," MPRA Paper 6374, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2007. "Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 61, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations As Evidence in Court," Game Theory and Information 9403008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Daughety, A. & Reinganum, J., 1991. "Keeping Society in the Dark : On the Admissibility of Pretrial Nogotiations as Evidence in Court," Working Papers 91-24, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1994. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," Working Papers 94-06, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1995. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 203-221, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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