Monopsony and Time-Consistency : Sustainable Pricing Policies for Perennial Grops
AbstractSince farmers in developing countries must make sunk investments to produce perennial crops, governments, in the guise of state-run marketing boards, face constraints on maximal sustainable price which can be charged by a marketing board assuming that "punishments" involve reversion to subsistence by untrusting farmers. This maximal price balances concerns about revenue extraction against the incentive of governments to cheat by capitalizing on sunk investments. Copyright 1997 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies in its series Papers with number 159.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1992
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farmers ; developing countries ; prices;
Other versions of this item:
- Besley, Timothy, 1997. "Monopsony and Time-Consistency: Sustainable Pricing Policies for Perennial Crops," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 57-70, February.
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