This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Quality Signaling and International Trade in Food Products

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Bureau, J.-C.
Gozlan, E.
Marette, S.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Focusing on the issue of food safety, the authors consider a framework of repeated purchases where adverse selection from imperfect information on product quality exists. Countries are characterized by their unequal ability to control quality.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number 99-13.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-13

Contact details of provider:
Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords: INFORMATION ; FOOD INDUSTRY ; INTERNATIONAL TRADE;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
L66 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Murphy, Kevin M. & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "Quality and trade," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-15, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Falvey, Rodney E, 1989. "Trade, Quality Reputations and Commercial Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(3), pages 607-22, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Grossman, Gene M & Shapiro, Carl, 1988. "Counterfeit-Product Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 59-75, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 1989. "The role of export subsidies when product quality is unknown," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1-2), pages 69-89, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 241-276, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Copeland, Brian R. & Kotwal, Ashok, 1996. "Product quality and the theory of comparative advantage," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1745-1760, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ellingsen, Tore, 1997. "Price signals quality: The case of perfectly inelastic demand," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 43-61, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Overgaard, P.B., 1989. "Price As A Signal Of Quality: A Discussion Of Equilibrium Concepts In Signalling Games," Economics Working Papers 1990-1, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
    Other versions:
  10. Edward E. Schlee, 1996. "The Value of Information About Product Quality," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 803-815, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Henson, Spencer & Brouder, Ann-Marie & Mitullah, Winnie, 2000. " Food Safety Requirements and Food Exports from Developing Countries: The Case of Fish Exports from Kenya to the European Union," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1159-69. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Donnenfeld, Shabtai & Weber, Shlomo & Ben-Zion, Uri, 1985. "Import controls under imperfect information," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 341-354, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Shapiro, Carl, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-79, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Doughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1997. "Everybody Out of the Pool: Products Liability, Punitive Damages, and Competition," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 410-32, October.
  17. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
  18. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Donze, J., 1996. "Refining in Continuous Signaling Games Satisfying the Single-Crossing Condition," Papers 976.422, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  21. Bagwell, Kyle & Ramey, Garey, 1993. "Advertising as Information: Matching Products to Buyers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 2(2), pages 199-243, Summer.
    Other versions:
  22. Haucap, Justus & Wey, Christian & Barmbold, Jens, 2000. "Location costs, product quality and implicit franchise contracts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 69-87, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  23. Hayes, Dermot J. & Shogren, Jason F. & Shin, Seung Youll & Kliebenstein, James B., 1995. "Valuing Food Safety in Experimental Auction Markets," Staff General Research Papers 835, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  24. Steven Shavell, 1994. "Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 20-36, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Donnenfeld, Shabtai, 1986. "Intra-industry trade and imperfect information about product quality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 401-417, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Otsuki, Tsunehiro & Wilson, John S. & Sewadeh, Mirvat, 2001. "Saving two in a billion: : quantifying the trade effect of European food safety standards on African exports," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 495-514, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Banerjee, Nandini & Kennedy, P. Lynn, 2006. "Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures : A Game Theoretic Approach of Comparative Evaluation," 2006 Annual Meeting, February 5-8, 2006, Orlando, Florida 35375, Southern Agricultural Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
  2. Steiner, Bodo, 2002. "The Valuation Of Labelling Attributes In A Wine Market," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19718, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  3. Zago, Angelo M. & Pick, Daniel, 2004. "Labeling Policies in Food Markets: Private Incentives, Public Intervention, and Welfare Effects," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(01), April. [Downloadable!]
  4. Fontaine, Damien & Gaspart, Frederic & Henry de Frahan, Bruno, 2008. "Modelling the impact of private quality standards on the fresh fruit and vegetable supply chains in developing countries," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 44378, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can include your works in the database easily by uploading them on the Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) if you do not have access to an institutional RePEc archive.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.