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Quality Signaling and International Trade in Food Products

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Author Info

  • Bureau, J.-C.
  • Gozlan, E.
  • Marette, S.

Abstract

Focusing on the issue of food safety, the authors consider a framework of repeated purchases where adverse selection from imperfect information on product quality exists. Countries are characterized by their unequal ability to control quality.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number 99-13.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-13

Contact details of provider:
Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.

Related research

Keywords: INFORMATION ; FOOD INDUSTRY ; INTERNATIONAL TRADE;

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References

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  1. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1992. "Advertising as Information: Matching Products to Buyers," Discussion Papers 1005, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Donnenfeld, Shabtai, 1986. "Intra-industry trade and imperfect information about product quality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 401-417, April.
  3. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
  4. Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-39, March.
  5. Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, 1986. "Counterfeit-Product Trade," NBER Working Papers 1876, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 241-276, August.
  7. Shapiro, Carl, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-79, November.
  8. Kyle Bagwell & R. Staiger, 1987. "The Role of Export Subsidies When Product Quality is Unknown," Discussion Papers 758, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Steven Shavell, 1994. "Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 20-36, Spring.
  10. Donnenfeld, Shabtai & Weber, Shlomo & Ben-Zion, Uri, 1985. "Import controls under imperfect information," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 341-354, November.
  11. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
  12. Murphy, Kevin M. & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "Quality and trade," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-15, June.
  13. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May.
  14. Julie A. Caswell & Neal H. Hooker, 1996. "HACCP as an International Trade Standard," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(3), pages 775-779.
  15. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December.
  16. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
  17. Doughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1997. "Everybody Out of the Pool: Products Liability, Punitive Damages, and Competition," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 410-32, October.
  18. Copeland, Brian R. & Kotwal, Ashok, 1996. "Product quality and the theory of comparative advantage," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1745-1760, December.
  19. Falvey, Rodney E, 1989. "Trade, Quality Reputations and Commercial Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(3), pages 607-22, August.
  20. Donze, J., 1996. "Refining in Continuous Signaling Games Satisfying the Single-Crossing Condition," Papers 976.422, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  21. Hayes, Dermot J. & Shogren, Jason F. & Shin, Seung Youll & Kliebenstein, James, 1995. "Valuing Food Safety in Experimental Auction Markets," Staff General Research Papers 835, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  22. Ellingsen, Tore, 1997. "Price signals quality: The case of perfectly inelastic demand," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 43-61, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Zago, Angelo M. & Pick, Daniel H., 2004. "Labeling Policies in Food Markets: Private Incentives, Public Intervention, and Welfare Effects," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(01), April.
  2. Steiner, Bodo E., 2002. "The Valuation Of Labelling Attributes In A Wine Market," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19718, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  3. Fontaine, Damien & Gaspart, Frederic & Frahan, Bruno Henry de, 2008. "Modelling the impact of private quality standards on the fresh fruit and vegetable supply chains in developing countries," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 44378, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  4. Banerjee, Nandini & Kennedy, P. Lynn, 2006. "Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures : A Game Theoretic Approach of Comparative Evaluation," 2006 Annual Meeting, February 5-8, 2006, Orlando, Florida 35375, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
  5. Bodo E. Steiner, 2004. "Australian wines in the British wine market: A hedonic price analysis," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(3), pages 287-307.
  6. Bonroy, O. & Constantatos, C., 2013. "On the economics of labels : a review of the theoretical literature," Working Papers 2013-01, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).

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