We analyze the choice of financial instruments to issue for a firm in a context where informational asymmetries exist in credit relationships. Investors are heterogenous since they do not possess identical firm-specific information. We generalize Boot and Thakor's (1993) approach but depart from their idea that asset splitting is facilitated by the presence of uninformed noisy traders.
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Paper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number
9739.
Length: 23 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9739
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