Concurrence en Contrats, anti-selection et structure d'information
AbstractThis paper generalizes the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz , and is dealing with a game where two principals compete for an agent, when the agent has private information. The studied game has an efficient equilibrium, when the payoff of the principal does not depend on private information. Competition in markets with asymmetric information does not always imply loss of efficiency. An explain in terms of type of uncertainty is proposed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number 9503.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.
contrats ; risque;
Other versions of this item:
- Marie-Cécile FAGART, 1996. "Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 43, pages 1-27.
- Fagart, Marie-Cécile, 1993. "Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9317, CEPREMAP.
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- Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
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