Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining
AbstractWe study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with the "n"-person noncooperative bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter representing the "continuation probability," [rho]. For general TU games, we characterize the set of payoffs from perfect equilibria for (1) small values of [rho]; and (2) large values of [rho]. For symmetric games a complete characterization for all values of [rho] is provided.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 10-93-31.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
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Postal: PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY PARK PENNSYLVANIA 16802 U.S.A.
Web page: http://econ.la.psu.edu/
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Other versions of this item:
- Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 259-72.
- Krishna, V. & Serrano, R., 1993. "Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 10, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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- Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2009. "Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 307-330, May.
- Ju, Y. & Wettstein, D., 2006. "Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: A Generalized Bidding Approach," Discussion Paper 2006-42, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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