Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining
Abstract
We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with the "n"-person noncooperative bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter representing the "continuation probability," [rho]. For general TU games, we characterize the set of payoffs from perfect equilibria for (1) small values of [rho]; and (2) large values of [rho]. For symmetric games a complete characterization for all values of [rho] is provided.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 10-93-31.Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pensta:10-93-31
Contact details of provider:
Postal: PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY PARK PENNSYLVANIA 16802 U.S.A.
Phone: (814)865-1456
Fax: (814)863-4775
Web page: http://econ.la.psu.edu/
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Related research
Keywords: game theory;Other versions of this item:
- Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 259-72.
- Krishna, V. & Serrano, R., 1993. "Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 10, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Roberto Serrano, 2007.
"Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value,"
Working Papers
2007-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Cooperative Games: Core And Shapley Value," Working Papers wp2007_0709, CEMFI.
- Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001.
"Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
- David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, . "Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Roberto Serrano, 2004.
"Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003,"
Working Papers
2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
- Corominas-Bosch, Margarida, 2000. "Bargaining with asymmetric threat points," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 333-339, December.
- Nicolás Porteiro, 2007. "An Efficient and Egalitarian Negotiation Procedure for Economies with Externalities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 19-40, January.
- Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2006.
"Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: a Generalized Bidding Approach,"
Keele Economics Research Papers
KERP 2006/06, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
- Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2009. "Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 307-330, May.
- Ju, Y. & Wettstein, D., 2006. "Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: A Generalized Bidding Approach," Discussion Paper 2006-42, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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