Dynamic Incentives, Occupational Choice, and the American Dream
AbstractThis paper introduces an overlapping generations model of the principal-agent problem. all individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Bargaining power and incentive contracts in the principle-agent relationships are determined by market forces.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 1-00-1.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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Postal: PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY PARK PENNSYLVANIA 16802 U.S.A.
Web page: http://econ.la.psu.edu/
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MORAL HAZARD ; GENERATIONS ; INFORMATION ; LABOUR ; INCENTIVES;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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- Dilip Mookherjee & Debraj Ray, 2000.
"Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
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- Maitreesh Ghatak & Nien-Huei Jiang, 2000. "A Simple Model of Inequality, Occupational Choice, and Development," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0007, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Huw Lloyd-Ellis, 2003. "On the Impact of Inequality on Productivity Growth in the Short and Long Term: A Synthesis," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 29(s1), pages 65-86, January.
- Ghatak, Maitreesh & Morelli, Massimo & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(4), pages 781-810, October.
- Dilip Mookherjee, 1999. "Contractual Constraints on Firm Performance in Developing Countries," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 98, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
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