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Dynamic Incentives, Occupational Choice, and the American Dream

Author

Listed:
  • Ghatak, M.
  • Morelli, M.
  • Sjostrom, T.

Abstract

This paper introduces an overlapping generations model of the principal-agent problem. all individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Bargaining power and incentive contracts in the principle-agent relationships are determined by market forces.

Suggested Citation

  • Ghatak, M. & Morelli, M. & Sjostrom, T., 2000. "Dynamic Incentives, Occupational Choice, and the American Dream," Papers 1-00-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:pensta:1-00-1
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Maitreesh Ghatak & Massimo Morelli & Tomas Sjöström, 2001. "Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(4), pages 781-810.
    2. Dilip Mookherjee & Debraj Ray, 2002. "Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 818-849, September.
    3. Huw Lloyd-Ellis, 2003. "On the Impact of Inequality on Productivity Growth in the Short and Long Term: A Synthesis," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 29(s1), pages 65-86, January.
    4. Dilip Mookherjee, 1999. "Contractual Constraints on Firm Performance in Developing Countries," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 98, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    MORAL HAZARD ; GENERATIONS ; INFORMATION ; LABOUR ; INCENTIVES;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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