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Pure Equilibria of Repreated Games with Public Information

Author

Listed:
  • Tomala, T

Abstract

The set of payoffs associated to pure uniform equilibria of a repeated game with public information is characterized in terms of the one shot-game. The key of the result is first, a description of equilibrium paths and second, the definition of new types of punishments.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomala, T, 1996. "Pure Equilibria of Repreated Games with Public Information," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 96.06, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:pariem:96.06
    as

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM ; ECONOMETRICS ; INFORMATION;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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