Income Taxes and Provision of Public Goods: Optima with Balanced Goverment Budgets
AbstractWe extend the Mirrlees model of optimal income taxation to include the optimal provision of public goods and we analyze the problem of budget balancedness.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Papiers d'Economie MathÃ©matique et Applications with number 2001.37.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
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Postal: France; Universite de Paris I - Pantheon- Sorbonne, 12 Place de Pantheon-75005 Paris, France
Phone: + 33 44 07 81 00
Fax: + 33 1 44 07 83 01
Web page: http://cermsem.univ-paris1.fr/
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INCOME ; TAXATION ; PUBLIC SECTOR ; BUDGET;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
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