Bargaining Over an Uncertain Outcome : The Role of Beliefs
AbstractWe study the Nash bargaining solution of a problem in which two agents bargain over an uncertain outcome. Under the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion, we study the way that solution varies, ex ante, when we vary the beliefs of one agent. Changing an agent's beliefs in a way that makes them "more distant" from the other agent's beliefs makes the second agent better off.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Papiers d'Economie MathÃ©matique et Applications with number 2000.73.
Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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Postal: France; Universite de Paris I - Pantheon- Sorbonne, 12 Place de Pantheon-75005 Paris, France
Phone: + 33 44 07 81 00
Fax: + 33 1 44 07 83 01
Web page: http://cermsem.univ-paris1.fr/
More information through EDIRC
RISK ; OUTCOME ; BELIEF;
Other versions of this item:
- Billot, A. & Chateauneuf, A. & Gilboa, I. & Tallon, J.-M., 2001. "Bargaining Over an Uncertain Outcome: The Role of Beliefs," Papers 2001-21, Tel Aviv.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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