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Bargaining Over an Uncertain Outcome : The Role of Beliefs

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Author Info
Billot, A.
Gilboa, I.

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Abstract

We study the Nash bargaining solution of a problem in which two agents bargain over an uncertain outcome. Under the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion, we study the way that solution varies, ex ante, when we vary the beliefs of one agent. Changing an agent's beliefs in a way that makes them "more distant" from the other agent's beliefs makes the second agent better off.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications with number 2000.73.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pariem:2000.73

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Postal: France; Universite de Paris I - Pantheon- Sorbonne, 12 Place de Pantheon-75005 Paris, France
Web page: http://cermsem.univ-paris1.fr/
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Related research
Keywords: RISK ; OUTCOME ; BELIEF;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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