The purpose of this paper is to investigate contract renegotiation in multi-agent situations where risk averse agents negotiate a contract offer to the principal after they observed a common, unverifiable perfect signal about their actions. Renegotiation gives the agents gains from mutual insurance.
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Paper provided by Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research in its series Papers with number
471.
Length: 33 pages Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:osakae:471
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
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