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Global Environmental Management: Incentives for Abatement Investment Anticipating an International Bargaining

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Author Info
Kiyono, K.
Okuno-Fujiwara, M.

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Abstract

When future international agreement for global environmental control is anticipated, decicions for controlling current carbon gas emissions by improving the country's abatement capabilities are strongly affected by the likelihood of and the likely outcome of such agreements. We construct a two period two country model where the quality of the atmospheric environment is a global public capital, and countries invets in abatement investments in the first period and engage in production activities in the second period.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research in its series Papers with number 452.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:osakae:452

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Keywords: ENVIRONMENT;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Scott Barrett, 1994. "The biodiversity supergame," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(1), pages 111-122, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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