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Brand Extension as Informational Leverage

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Author Info
Pil Choi, J.

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Abstract

The marketing literature refers to the concept of brand capital and provides empirical evidence that firms with a large stock of well-established brands have an advantage in introducing new products. This paper develops a theory of brand extension as a mechanism for informational leverage in which a firm leverages off a good's reputation in one market to alleviate the problem of informational asymmetry encountered in other markets. It is shown that brand extension helps a multi-product monopolist introduce a new experience good with less price distortion. Thus, the paper provides a theoretical foundation for the concept of brand capital.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research in its series Papers with number 451.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:osakae:451

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Postal: OSAKA UNIVERSITY, THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH(I.S .E.R.), 6-1 MIHOGAOKA IBARAKI OSAKA 567 JAPAN
Fax: 81-6-6878-2766
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Web page: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/
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Related research
Keywords: INFORMATION ; MARKETING;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
M3 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising

Cited by:
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  1. Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2004. "Selling Reputation When Going out of Business, June 2004," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ken Hendricks & Alan Sorensen, 2006. "Information Spillovers in the Market for Recorded Music," NBER Working Papers 12263, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Thomas Liebi, 2002. "Trusting Labels: A Matter of Numbers?," Diskussionsschriften dp0201, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
  4. Lynne Pepall & Dan Richards, 1999. "The Simple Economics of "Brand-Stretching"," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9905, Department of Economics, Tufts University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2008. "Umbrella Branding and External Certification," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Olivier Gergaud & Florine Livat, 2004. "Team versus individual reputations : a model of interaction and some empirical evidence," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla04015, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
  7. Martin Peitz & Paolo G. Garella, 1999. "- Exclusive Dealing Clauses Facilitate Entry," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-17, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  8. Luis Garicano & Tano Santos, 2004. "Referrals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 499-525, June. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Luis Garicano & Tano Santos, 2001. "Referrals," NBER Working Papers 8367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Miklos-Thal, Jeanine, 2008. "Linking Reputations: The Signaling and Feedback Effects of Umbrella Branding," MPRA Paper 11045, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  10. Tianxi Wang, 2007. "The Reputation of an Organization and its Dynamics," Economics Discussion Papers 637, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Jay Pil Choi & Doh-Shin Jeon, 2007. "A Leverage Theory of Reputation Building with Co-branding: Complementarity in Reputation Building," Economics Working Papers 1019, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  12. Hakenes, Hendrik & Peitz, Martin, 2004. "Selling Reputation When Going out of Business," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-52, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  13. Luigi Luini & Andrea Mangani, 2004. "Trademarks, Product Variety, and Economic Activity in Italy and Europe," Department of Economics University of Siena 422, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
  14. Giovanni B. Ramello, 2004. "Intellectual property and the markets of ideas," LIUC Papers in Economics 161, Cattaneo University (LIUC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2006. "Umbrella Branding and the Provision of Quality," Discussion Papers 132, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2006. "Observable Reputation Trading," Discussion Papers 131, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2007. "Observable Reputation Trading," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(2), pages 693-730, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Martin Peitz, 2000. "Exclusionary Practices and Entry Under Asymmetric Information," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1197, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  18. Georg von Graevenitz, 2007. "Which Reputations Does a Brand Owner Need? Evidence from Trade Mark Opposition," Discussion Papers 215, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  19. Thomas Liebi, 2002. "Monitoring Eco-Labels: You Can Have Too Much of a Good Thing," Diskussionsschriften dp0207, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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